The UK Financial Times reports on grumbling by UK firms about regulatory imperialism by the US SEC and PCAOB post-Sarbanes-Oxley:
Having US inspectors trawling through foreign audit firms must mean wasteful activity. Even where there is a high degree of co-operation, some repetition is bound to occur. And achieving this co-operation will not be possible without large amounts of time and effort that could have been directed elsewhere.
Extending the US writ in this way is offensive at a deeper level. This requirement of Sarbox amounts to telling audit regulators throughout the rest of the world that the US authorities do not believe they will do a proper job. Behaving as though you have a monopoly of virtue is rarely attractive and in this case is also misplaced, since Sarbox falls far short of a regulatory ideal. Even more fundamentally, it is unacceptable that legislators in one country can declare unilaterally that their law should run outside their - jurisdiction.
The obvious answer would be some form of reciprocity. If an audit firm has been approved by UK regulators, that ought to be good enough for the PCAOB.
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Why the assumption that if an audit firm is good enough for the UK regulators, it’s good enough for the PCAOB? First, audit standards are different in both countries. Second, UK regulators are largely toothless. They bring less than 12 enforcement cases each year, and when they do issue a fine (such as the $30 million fine levied against Shell, the largest fine by a factor of four ever levied), they are a pittance.
As just an example, are you convinced that UK regulators insist on the thoroughness of the audits conducted on LSE-listed Russian companies? (We do--hence the inspection of the UK audit firms.)