Peter Lattman posts the following question for discussion:
AmLaw’s analysis shows shows 357 indictments in major corporate fraud cases between 2002 and 2005. In 2006, there were only 14 indictments identified by the Justice Department as significant cases and only 12 major corporate fraud cases brought in 2007, AmLaw reports. Here’s the more than 4,000-word story, providing a nifty overview of white-collar crime over the past half-decade.
The DOJ told AmLaw that the recent decline in prosecutions is actually a sign of the remarkable success of the Corporate Fraud Task Force. “You’re getting a lot more focus on compliance, and on ethics internally in corporate structures,” says Joan Meyer, senior counsel to the deputy AG. And Debra Yang, the former U.S. Attorney in L.A. now at Gibson Dunn, said “We picked off the low-hanging fruit. We got all the big bad players, or most of them. The mandate has always been not to strangle corporate America, but to put investor confidence back into the market, which I think we have.”
AmLaw issued a press release on the story, in which the magazine’s editor Aric Press is quoted summarizing the issue: “The DOJ maintains that the decline is simply a mark of its success, in combination with Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms, but others question whether prosecutors have been diverted by new priorities. Our reporting raises a critical question: has the problem of corporate fraud really been ‘solved’ or has the Justice Department simply stopped trying as hard to prosecute it?”
Whaddya think, O Loyal and Beloved Law Blog readers?
The decline in indictments is consistent with a decline in private securities litigation filings during the same period. Cornerstone’s mid-2007 analysis of private securities litigation filings reported that:
Securities class action filings are well below historical averages for the fourth consecutive six-month period, finds a new mid-year report released today by the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse in cooperation with Cornerstone Research. The 59 filings recorded in the first half of 2007 (January through June 22, 2007) represent a 42 percent drop from the average semi-annual filing rate of 101 (mid-year periods July 1996 through June 2005). The number of filings in the first half of 2007 was slightly above the second half of 2006 total of 53. For the two-year period beginning the second half of 2005, the average semi-annual filing rate was 61 filings, 40 percent below the average observed over the preceding nine-year period.
You’ve got several factors that explain the decline in both public and private enforcement activity. First, fraud is always more rampant during a bubble than otherwise, especially at the end of a bubble. The bursting of the tech bubble left behind a lot of work for both public and private enfocrers. As Yang correctly observed, there was a lot of low hanging fruit that has now been plucked. Second, and conversely, the recently strong but not bubbling stock market has left investors reasonably happy and less likely to sue or, for that matter, to have reason to sue. Third, SOX and related legal reforms probably has helped clean up some of the worst offenses that previously would have generated litigation. Fourth, post-Enron, the gatekeepers have been more active. Auditing firms, in particular, are working much harder at fraud prevention than in the past.
All in all, it’s unlikely to be a matter of prosecutorial discretion. Instead, there probably has been a real drop in the supply of cases.
Should we be surprised that the people who are paid for watching a problem routinely interpret any statistic possible as proof of their success? In contrast, did the SEC scold itself for having established the regulatory environment which gave us Enron, WorldCom, and Global crossing?
I’d like to echo the sentiment above about an alarming lack of action by government when documented crime on behalf of certain parties is ignored.
The recent scandal at HP where the company failed to disclose the that a director resigned due to a dispute generated a lot of press.
But what is needed to draw attention to a case with more egregious disclosure violations?
http://www.bankruptcymisconduct.com/files/SECAURHBDreq1.pdf
Is there a common theme associated with the probability and intensity of SEC enforcement? Does offending a powerful venture capital firm set the enforcement ball in motion? Does association with billion dollar hedge funds or certain powerful law firms effectively forestall SEC inquiry and/or enforcement?
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We humbly state we have to disagree with the assumption that the supply of cases has declined. It assumes facts not in evidence and has the benefit of apple to orange reflections.
Today we were offered the chance to participate in a Grant empirical study on how large scale fraud has become more sophisticated (and prosecuted less) while mom and pop issues suffer the brunt of endeavors.
We challenge you are those that you could assign to study such, to review the facts about the eToys case as documented on our sites, including a look at http://www.wjfa.net/bk/etoys.html and http://www.wellsofjustice.com
The BACPRA reform Act contained within it a repeal of the disclosure requirements for Investment Banks (Hedge funds)
What has occurred is a perversion of Code(s) and syndicated “powerfully” connected White Collar crimes where a person can abuse the special counsel doctrine and be related to an investment bank with ample connections that assure millions in fraudulent billings under the pretense and color of law.
Everywhere we look we find manifest injustice and have stopped digging because we can Not get anyone to pay attention to the 100 felony violations we have documented by Official Court docket records.