My essay There is No Affirmative Action for Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, in Corporate Law has been posted to SSRN. Abstract:
I review and comment herein on Anupam Chander’s article, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 Yale L.J. 119 (2003). My critique focuses mainly on his underlying premise or, to put it another way, on showing that his analysis of corporate law doctrine is fundamentally flawed. Chander argues that, unlike constitutional law, “corporate law places minorities at the heart of its endeavor.” Central to his project is an empirical claim that corporate law has an “elaborate framework” for “minority interests in the corporation.” I argue that Chander’s theoretical construct rests on a doctrinal foundation of sand. He persistently overstates the extent to which corporate law protects minority shareholders, while understating the freedom that law gives majority shareholders.
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You are correct. I’ve been practicing corporate law for 30 years, and in that time I have never dealt with a shareholder dispute case where, under Pennsylvania law at least, there was anything even remotely resembling an “elaborate framework” for protecting minority shareholder interests. There are minority shareholder protections under the Pa. Bus. Corps. Law, and PA decisional law, but they are few. Corporations act on the democratic principle, in which the majority rules.