I heard that a certain student-run law review assesses submissions on the basis of whether acceptance is likely to increase the journal’s citation rank – in particular whether the average number of citations per article for the author is higher than the average number of citations per article for the law review.
Prof. Green is worried about the effect such a policy would have on publication of philosophy of law articles. (My guess is none. Law reviews love stuff that doesn’t involve actual law.)
In contrast, I see this as a case in which transparency may not be ideal. If I agree to accept an offer from a journal whose average citation rate per article is lower than my average citation rate per article, the odds are very good that my average will go down while their’s goes up. And that helps me how? Instead, I want to get the article placed with a journal whose average citation rate is significantly higher than mine. But why would they take it? We seem likely to end up with a situation in which the market won’t clear.
If we assume that journals wish to maximize their citation count, then it is probably in their interest to consider an array of factors that determine a particular article’s propensity to be cited, including the article’s quality, topic, and author. It’s also fair to assume that this information is common knowledge among the author and editor. So, at equilibrium, an editor will accept a lower-quality paper from a highly cited author--so long as the weighted average of article quality, author reputation, and topic interest is high enough. At the same time, the author would accept the bargain, since “overplacing” the paper in this manner would increase the article’s citation rate above what it should have been, given its quality and topic. This may reduce the author’s overall citation rate, but it keeps his or her citation rate above what it should be given the quality of the work he has done in a particular case.
In other words, if this kind of calculation is going on among editors, at equilibrium, a highly cited author can probably “overplace” a mediocre paper, while a less-cited author might need to “underplace” a quality paper.
More generally, this doesn’t seem like a case for a large market failure with many unplaced articles, although there will be a fair amount of inefficiency in terms of systematic mismatches between article and journal quality driven by reputational effects.
If we assume that journals wish to maximize their citation count, then it is probably in their interest to consider an array of factors that determine a particular article’s propensity to be cited, including the article’s quality, topic, and author. It’s also fair to assume that this information is common knowledge among the author and editor. So, at equilibrium, an editor will accept a lower-quality paper from a highly cited author--so long as the weighted average of article quality, author reputation, and topic interest is high enough. At the same time, the author would accept the bargain, since “overplacing” the paper in this manner would increase the article’s citation rate above what it should have been, given its quality and topic. This may reduce the author’s overall citation rate, but it keeps his or her citation rate above what it should be given the quality of the work he has done in a particular case.
In other words, if this kind of calculation is going on among editors, at equilibrium, a highly cited author can probably “overplace” a mediocre paper, while a less-cited author might need to “underplace” a quality paper.
More generally, this doesn’t seem like a case for a large market failure with many unplaced articles, although there will be a fair amount of inefficiency in terms of systematic mismatches between article and journal quality driven by reputational effects.